I. Introduction NATO founding member in 1949, France maintained a tumultuous relationship with the organization since 1966, when President Charles de Gaulle decided to remove French soldiers from the NATO integrated military command to protect French national sovereignty. American and other foreign soldiers were requested to leave French territory, and NATO headquarters and command centers in Paris, Fontainebleau and Rocquencourt were moved to Brussels and Mons(1). Until the 1990s, a Gaullist consensus prevailed across the political spectrum: France should preserve its independence in the Cold War and propose a middle-way between West and East. Nevertheless, France remained part of the North Atlantic Alliance and of NATO’s political decision-making bodies, and maintained close cooperation with NATO on the operational level. After the end of the Cold War, France made major contributions to NATO’s first military operations. French transatlantic exceptionalism became more difficult to uphold: moves towards normalization were made in the 1990s and the 2000s, and President Nicolas Sarkozy took the ultimate step by announcing France’s “full participation in the structures of NATO”(2) in March 2009. The debate of 2008 and 2009 about whether France should return to full participation in NATO revealed a cleavage between neo-Gaullists, Atlanticists and pro-Europeans in French foreign policy, as well as a divergence of views between the military and the public. Since then, the debate seemed closed: Hubert Védrine, tasked by the new President François Hollande in 2012 to assess the consequences of France’s “return”, concluded that reversing Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision was not an option, and France should make the most of the new situation within NATO. However, since then, the international security context changed dramatically: the rise of the Islamic State in the Middle East and Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Ukraine gave rise to new concerns about NATO’s relevance. What does France want from NATO today? How did perceptions of NATO by the politicians, the military and the public change since 2009? Despite the normalization of France’s position within NATO, the traditional Gaullist defiance towards the US-led organization remains strong; however, behind the political discourse, France maintains a pragmatic approach to NATO as a practical military tool on the operational level. This position, which appears contradictory, is consistent with French exceptionalism and marks a continuity with the debates of both 1966 and 2009. II. Traditional defiance towards NATO as an American-led organization a. The Gaullist consensus after 1966 In order to understand France’s ambiguous position towards NATO today, it is important to remember the roots of Charles De Gaulle’s decision to remove France from NATO’s integrated command structure in 1966, and why this position was maintained across the political spectrum until 2009. In 1966, De Gaulle decided to remove France from what he perceived to be an American and British dominated command structure(3) to which France was subordinate(4). Indeed, in September 1958, the US President Eisenhower and British Premier Macmillan rejected a memorandum submitted by De Gaulle proposing a new NATO with a tripartite directory(5). France understood the 1956 Suez crisis, in which a Franco-British operation to control the Suez Canal failed because of lack of US support, as a warning that the United States could not be fully trusted, and that France should back its own freedom of action with military force(6). By 1966, the Algerian war had ended, and France had developed its own nuclear “force de frappe” since 1963, so it could afford such an independent policy course – at least in rhetoric. The public was taken aback by De Gaulle’s decision, as the communist threat was still strong in the French hearts and minds(7). A poll conducted by Ifop between March 12 and 22nd, 1966 reveals that 38% of the population were against France’s retreat from NATO’s integrated command, while only 22% were in favor(8). In the political arena, the communists supported De Gaulle’s move(9), but to most other parties the move came as a surprise. The military, as a traditionally conservative force, was also doubtful of the decision(10), but soon adapted to the will of the politics(11). Nevertheless, France’s special relationship with NATO soon became the new normal. Charles de Gaulle was able to pluck at the heartstrings of the French people by calling upon national sovereignty: the traumatism of the defeat of 1940 was still engraved in collective memory, and so was the wounded pride of having been liberated from Nazism by American, and not French soldiers. French politicians still resented the fact that the United States originally considered putting France under the temporary administration of an Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) after World War II, a move which De Gaulle fiercely opposed(12). By saying “no” to NATO in 1966, France symbolically compensated for the defeat of 1940 (13). Successive presidents, both left-wing, such as François Mitterrand, and right-wing, such as Jacques Chirac, gradually adopted what came to be known as the “Gaullist consensus” on France’s national independence, upholding an official position at a safe distance from NATO, and actively promoting European defense. Olivier Kempf considers that the traditional consensus was so strong and widely accepted, that it could only be broken by somebody from De Gaulle’s own party, such as Jacques Chirac, who made France reintegrate NATO’s military committee in 1995, and Nicolas Sarkozy, who made the final step towards full participation(14). b. The debate of 2008-2009 After drafting a new White Paper on security and defense in 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy announced his willingness to make France a full participant in NATO again. In March 2009, the decision was made: France would participate in all NATO structures except the Nuclear Planning Group, and would receive in exchange for its return the key command position of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). The NATO issue thus briefly came back to the foreground of political and academic debates for several months, bringing back old phantoms of 1966. The Socialist Party stressed the importance of France’s independent foreign policy : “La France a préservé depuis 40 ans une position particulière sur la scène internationale, alliée des Etats-Unis mais pas alignée, lui conférant un rôle singulier dans le dialogue multilatéral et la préservation de la paix (15)». The socialist Hubert Védrine most notably opposed France’s normalization in NATO as early as 2007, in his report on France and Globalization (16). François Bayrou, from the centrist MODEM party, argued that returning to full NATO participation would be “a defeat for Europe” and the end of the European defense policy (17). Even within the president’s own party UMP, Dominique de Villepin fiercely criticized Sarkozy’s move: “Au fil des années, nous avons pris, c’est vrai, des initiatives pour maximiser la contribution de la France au fonctionnement de l’OTAN, mais toujours avec le même souci : préserver notre position originale et singulière au sein de l’organisation. Ce qu’on nous propose aujourd’hui est une rupture politique et symbolique (18)». On March 17th, 2009, Prime Minister François Fillon engaged the government’s responsibility before the National Assembly on this decision, who supported the government at 329 votes to 238 (19). As opposed to the politicians, the military was decisively in favor of France’s return to full participation in NATO. The military was primarily concerned with the fact that France contributed troops to NATO operations, but its officers were not present in the command structures - a position which was increasingly unsustainable on the strategic and operational levels (20). Returning to full participation in NATO’s structures in 2009 created new command positions and career opportunities for the French military: in 2009, 750 officers joined NATO’s General Staff (21). In the public, Nicolas Sarkozy’s decisions sparked some emotional reactions out of concern for France’s national sovereignty and independence vis-à-vis the United States, but a poll by Ifop conducted on March 5th and 6th, 2009 showed that 58% of the French were in favor of France’s return to NATO full participation, while only 37% were against it (22). c. Today, French exceptionalism remains Today, seven years after France’s return to full participation in NATO’s structures, the debate on whether France belongs in NATO has died out (23). In 2012, Hubert Védrine, who opposed the return in 2007, was tasked by the new president François Hollande to examine the consequences of France’s return in NATO’s command structures (24). Only three years after the reintegration, the assessment was mitigated: France’s presence in NATO increased, its influence was strong on NATO’s reform, but weak in NATO’s strategy and operations; in terms of finances, the cost of reintegration was smaller than expected and France did win economic and industrial opportunities, although it is unclear whether these were actually linked with the return in the integrated military command. The report concluded that, while leaving the NATO integrated command structure once again would be deemed as a sign of instability by France’s partners, France should make the most of the new situation created by its return and exercise more influence within the Alliance. Since Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision was not put in question by the alternating political power, the debate on whether France should fully participate in NATO was closed (25). Only the far-right and the far-left still advocate for leaving NATO, as showed the vehement reactions of Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen against a law changing the status of NATO personnel stationed in France in January 2016 (26). However, in spite of France’s de facto normalization within NATO, the political mindset about NATO did not evolve much (27), and the French political discourse on the organization is consistent with French exceptionalism. Indeed, the Védrine report of 2012 states: “La question est plutôt de déterminer comment la France défendra au mieux (…) ses intérêts fondamentaux de sécurité et de défense, son indépendance, son autonomie de décision, et donc, (…) la maîtrise de son destin, à la fois au sein de l’Alliance, dans l’Union européenne, avec des partenaires européens, (…) ces actions ne formant que les différentes facettes d’une seule et même politique déployée dans des enceintes diverses. (28)». Although France is strongly committed to the transatlantic Alliance, it considers itself allied, but not aligned (29). France sees NATO as an organization dominated by American interests. NATO is being criticized for driving European states to decrease defense spending and lose capabilities because of the reliance on the erroneous promise that the United States will always defend Europe (30). In line with the US pivot to Asia and the lack of US involvement in solving the Ukraine crisis, France acknowledges that the United States will not stay in Europe forever and believes that Europe should prepare for and hasten this event (31). France is also critical of NATO enlargement towards the East into Russia’s neighborhood, and would like to keep the organization focused on collective defense (32), as there is a concern that NATO could involve France in operations where it does not want to go (33). While few argue for France’s exit from the organization, the debate on about the purpose of the organization in the post-Cold War world is still relevant in France (34). III. Pragmatic view of NATO as a practical operational tool a. Gradual rapprochement since 1966 In parallel with the French political discourse on NATO portraying France as “amie, alliée mais pas alignée”, in other words a transatlantic ally with an independent policy within the organization, France has been making moves towards close cooperation with NATO on the operational level ever since Charles de Gaulle decided to leave the integrated command structures in 1966. Indeed, as early as December 1966, De Gaulle negotiated a bilateral agreement with Willy Brandt allowing French troops to remain deployed in Germany despite France’s break with NATO. In August 1967, the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreement provided that the French armed forces stationed in Germany could be attached to NATO in the event of war, while remaining under the authority of the President of the Republic (35). Already in the 1990s, some efforts were secretly made under French President François Mitterrand to negotiate France’s full return to NATO, and President Jacques Chirac took essential steps by reintegrating France in two NATO intergovernmental bodies: the Defense Ministers meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee.(36) In 2004, France obtained 110 positions in the reformed command structure following the CEMA-SACEUR agreement, and became the 4th contributor to the newly created NATO Response Force (NRF) (37). In terms of military operations, France was a major contributor in NATO operations in Bosnia (1993), Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2001). A 2007 report by the French Senate showed the extent of the French de facto integration in NATO, put in evidence by the increased presence of French officers in command structures, by the contribution in the civil budget and by the participation in NATO’s main armament programs (38). This continuous policy of operational “rapprochement” since 1966 reflects a very pragmatic view of NATO as a practical framework for military action, from which France should profit despite the political Gaullist stance promoting national sovereignty and French exceptionalism. b. NATO, an operational toolbox and a political forum According to the 2013 French White Paper on security and defense, one of NATO’s objectives is to be “the common framework for military action whenever the Allies agree to intervene together to respond to shared risks and threats.(39)” Indeed, in France, NATO is considered important as an operational toolbox and a political forum for multilateral military action. According to Hubert Védrine’s 2007 report, the military was in favor of NATO reintegration because of advantages in terms of procedures, interoperability with European allies and coherence of training and combat methods (40). The military see NATO as a practical machine to enable Europeans to conduct operations together and maintain and update their defense capabilities. Moreover, the participation of the United States helps fill France’s gaps in terms of surveillance, reconnaissance and air-to-air refueling. Indeed, as pressure on defense budgets increases, France has to rely on cooperation and integration to maintain an operational army. Since France’s European allies prefer NATO to the European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as a framework for cooperation, it was necessary to include the French military in the NATO system (41). In addition, politicians see NATO as a forum for multilateral discussions on security and defense issues. NATO has proven useful in this regard at the Wales Summit in September 2014, during which several NATO members created the “coalition of the willing” led by the United States to fight ISIS in Iraq. Lastly, NATO is also seen as an opportunity for the French defense industry: General Palomeros, former Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), argued that “La « Smart Defence » (…) représente une réelle opportunité pour l’industrie française de defense.(42)” However, praising NATO because of its efficiency as an operational tool tends to confuse the means with the ends: NATO is efficient, but the question is what it brings in strategic terms (43). Indeed, some are worried that NATO acts as a “security agency” promoting interoperability under U.S. standards and thereby weakening efforts towards a European defense (44). NATO critics also argue that despite some French market gains, NATO’s procurement programs mostly benefit the American defense industry, to the detriment of the European defense industries. c. NATO, one forum among others Nevertheless, France does not see NATO as the only possible framework for military action. The 2013 White Paper states that “France’s open approach to the world is also underlined by its active participation in numerous multilateral organizations (…) and, particularly with respect to its defense and security, its membership of three major institutions (…), namely the UN, NATO and the European Union.” There is no clear hierarchy between these three structures, but a particular attention is paid to the European Union. France is historically a major proponent of European defense and argues that NATO and the EU are not competing, but complementary organizations (45). One of the goals behind NATO reintegration, according to Nicolas Sarkozy, was to promote European defense by gaining the trust of the United States and of European partners (46). European defense did not make any substantial progress since then, but still, for its military interventions in Mali and in Central African Republic in 2013, France called on the EU and the UN for support, not NATO. However, nowadays western military operations tend to be conducted on the basis of coalitions, and not through multinational frameworks, as have shown the examples of the interventions in Lybia and Syria. To sum up, today, French politicians, military and public do not expect much from NATO: it is a practical framework for military action, but not a central tool of security and defense policy. IV. Conclusion France’s sensational departure from NATO’s integrated command structures in 1966 and the equally polemic return to full participation in NATO in 2009 raised important debates in France about the country’s role in NATO, and the purpose of the organization after the end of the Cold War. In fact, reintegrating the military command in 2009 was coherent with France’s gradual de facto reintegration in NATO since the 1990s, and did not mark the end of French exceptionalism – France still believes it has to defend a particular position in NATO in line with its national interests, to preserve an independent foreign policy. Underlying this political conception, France has been pursuing a pragmatic policy of rapprochement with NATO on the operational level, to benefit from the advantages of the organization in terms of interoperability and preservation of capabilities. With the pressure on defense budgets, France cannot afford a foreign policy based on exceptionalism (47). The view of French politicians, military and public is shared between a Gaullist defiance towards an American-dominated NATO, and a pragmatic consideration of the organization as a practical framework for military action. While the politicians are engaged in a debate of principle on France’s in relation to NATO and the United States, the military largely see NATO as an efficient toolbox for military interventions. The public, both in 1966 and 2009, saw France’s NATO membership favorably, but NATO itself is mostly seen as a tool of the United States’ influence in Europe. Today, NATO is not a major theme in the media: the organization is mainly mentioned in relation with ongoing military operations, and is rarely a subject in itself. The debate on France’s NATO membership is closed, and the organization itself is losing importance in France’s security and defense policy. The international security landscape has dramatically changed since the creation of NATO: Europe is not threatened by a conventional war on its territory against invasion by another State, as it was at the time of the Cold War. Today, threats come from terrorism and hybrid warfare, of which France was a direct target on January 11th and November 15th 2015. The US disengagement from Europe could sooner or later change the dynamics of NATO. On April 7th, 2016, Donald Trump, candidate in the primary of the Republican party of the United States, argued that NATO is obsolete and that the United States should not take up such a large share of the European defense burden (48). The upcoming elections in the United States and in France could thus possibly reopen the debate on NATO’s purpose and France’s role in it. 1 Claude Cartigny, « 1966: La France quitte les organismes militaires de l’OTAN », 2006. 2 Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, March 11th, 2009. Available at . 3 Anne-Henry de Russé, « La France dans l’OTAN », IFRI, 2010. 4 Press Conference of Charles de Gaulle on February 21st, 1966. Available at: . 5 Lettre et mémorandum du général de Gaulle au général Eisenhower (17 septembre 1958). Available at: . 6 Olivier Kempf, L’OTAN au XXIe siècle, 2010, p. 136. 7 Dominique Vidal, “Ce que voulait De Gaulle en 1966”, in Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2008. 8 Frédéric Dabi, « Sondage : Les Français ont toujours été partisans de l’Otan », Paris Match, 11.03.2009. 9 Dominique Vidal, April 2008. 10 Hubert Védrine, Rapport pour le Président de la République sur la France et la Mondialisation, 4.09.2007, p.37. 11 Interview with General Vincent Desportes, 13.04.2016. 12 Charles Robertson, When Roosevelt planned to govern France, 2011, vii. 13 Olivier Kempf, L’OTAN au XXIe siècle, 2010, p. 137. 14 Olivier Kempf, 2010, p. 139. 15 Communiqué du Bureau National du Parti Socialiste „Pour l’indépendance de la politique étrangère de la France“, 10.02.2009. 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A reassessment of France–NATO relations since reintegration”, in Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 12:4, 2014. 24 Hubert Védrine, Rapport pour le Président de la République Française sur les conséquences du retour de la France dans le commandement intégré de l’OTAN, sur l’avenir de la relation transatlantique et les perspectives de l’Europe de la Défense, 2012. 25 Interview with Olivier Kempf, military commander and researcher at IRIS, 25.04.2016. 26 “OTAN: Le Pen et Mélenchon ne veulent pas de GIs en France”, in Le Parisien, 22.01.2016. 27 Interview with General Jean-Louis Georgelin, 25.04.2016. 28 Hubert Védrine, 2012, 10. 29 Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech at the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg-Kehl, 4.04.2009. 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